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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear thjis appeal by virtue of the pour 
over order of the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
On Appeal: The issues on Appellant's appeal largely involve a contractual 
provision for attorney fees, so the first inquiry is which party, if any, prevailed on contract 
claims, with the other issues being subsidiary to that. Accordingly, the issues are: 
a. Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in determining that neither 
Appellant i4 nor Appellee Robertson's were prevailing parties in their mutual 
breach of contract claims against each other. 
Standard of review: "Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is 
a decision left to the sound discretion of the trial courtl and reviewed for an abuse 
of discretion." Carlson Distrib. Co. v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C., 2004 UT App 
227,116 (citing UT. Nielson, Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 25, 40 P.3d 1119); see 
Paul deGrootBldg. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, [^18 ("The award of 
attorney fees is typically a matter of law, which we review for correctness. This, 
however, is not true where the fees are predicated upoji findings of fact, in which 
case we review the award of fees for an abuse of discretion") (internal citations to 
Cook, {supra) and Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 pT 102,121 omitted). 
To the extent that i4 argues, as it must, that the trial court erred in declining 
to find that Robertson's breached the contract (that is, in finding the Robertson's 
did not breach), such a finding should be reviewed under the clear error standard. 
Findings will be upheld unless the finding is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or the appellate court reaches "a firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App.1997). The 
party asserting the lack of evidentiary support must marshal the evidence 
supporting the finding and demonstrate that it is insufficient. Id; Pasker, Gould, 
Ames & Weavery Inc. v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994). 
b. Issue: Whether the trial court was correct in determining that neither party 
should be awarded attorney fees, where no party prevailed on contract claims, but 
the prevailing party prevailed only on an unjust enrichment claim. 
Standard of review: "As a general rule, attorney fees may be awarded only 
when they are authorized by statute or contract." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 
2004 UT 85, f23 {citing Foote v. Clark, 962 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1998). "Whether 
attorney fees are recoverable in an action is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 2004 UT 85, f22 {quoting 
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah 1998). 
On Cross Appeal: The issues on Cross Appeal deal with whether the trial court 
was correct in granting judgment to Appellant i4 based on unjust enrichment and whether 
this Court should award Robertson's its attorney fees in this appeal for defending against 
i4's appeal for attorney fees under the contract: 
c. Issue: Whether the trial court could conclude |hat i4 was entitled to 
judgment based on unjust enrichment, where there was an express contract dealing 
with the identical subject matter. 
Standard of review: Whether the trial court's jlegal conclusion was correct 
is a question of law, which is reviewed for "correctness, granting no deference to 
the trial judge's legal determinations." Glacier Land\Co., LLC v. Claudia Klawe 
&Assocs., LLC, 2006 UT App 516, f l4 (quotingHeadowbrook, LLC v. 
Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1998). 
d. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals should award Robertson's its 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending againslj i4's appeal, which is its only 
issue and which is based solely on the contractual provision for attorney fees. 
Standard of Review: This is a question of law, which at this stage is not 
reviewable 
e. Issue: Whether the trial court's findings of fact were sufficient to support 
the legal conclusions that i4 prevailed on a theory of uhjust enrichment.1 
Standard of review: Whether the trial court's findings of fact are sufficient 
to support its decision is reviewed under a clearly errotieous standard: "[T]he 
knowledge or appreciation 
r circumstances that would 
Those factual elements being (1) a benefit conferred, Q 
of the benefit and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit ud 
be unjust unless Robertson's paid the reasonable value thereo 
3 
court must set forth the reasons for its decision in enough detail for the reviewing 
court to determine whether they are clearly erroneous." Lysenko v. Sawaya, 1999 
UT App 3 H 9, 973 P2d 445, 448 (affd 2000 UT 56); but see Groberg v. Horn. 
Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67, f 12 ("Whether a claimant has been unjustly 
enriched is a mixed question of law and fact. We uphold a lower court's findings of 
fact unless the evidence supporting them is so lacking that we must conclude the 
finding is clearly erroneous. Furthermore, we afford broad discretion to the trial 
court in its application of unjust enrichment law to the facts.") 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008): 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action 
based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 
28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing 
allow at least one party to recover attorney fees. 
STATEMENT O F THE C A S E 
Nature of the case: 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, Salt Lake 
Department, in a case involving a contract to create a website. The parties each claimed 
the other had breached the contract between them or, in the alternative that the other had 
been unjustly enriched. Appellee Robertson's complaint alleged Appellant i4 breached 
its agreement with Robertson's by failing to timely create a website and provide it to 
Robertson's. In the alternative Robertson's alleged i4 was unjustly enriched by receiving 
4 
payment for the website without providing it. i4fs counterclaim alleged Robertson's 
breached the contract or that Robertson's was unjustly enricDied. 
Course of the proceedings: 
Bench trial was held on August 28, 2008, after whichthe trial court took the matter 
under advisement. The trial court then entered its minute entty ruling on September 3, 
2008, which granted judgment in favor of i4 on only its unju$t enrichment claim, with 
each party to bear its own attorney fees and costs. 
i4 then filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees on September 8, 2008. By minute 
entry dated October 2, 2008, the trial court declined to find tbat i4 prevailed on its 
contract claim, which i4 had requested, and declined to change its ruling on the issue of 
attorney fees. i4 then drafted findings of fact and conclusion^ of law and the judgment. 
Disposition at trial: 
The trial court found in favor of i4 on its claim of unjust enrichment, awarding it 
$1,800, but the court declined to find that either party prevailed on the contract claims. 
The trial court ordered each party to cover their own attorney| fees and costs. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS2 
1. Appellee Robertson's is a local retail seller of b0ats and related marine 
products. Because it desired to enhance its presence in the electronic marketplace, in 
2Because the findings of fact prepared by i4 were so limited and simply parroted the trial 
court's minute entry ruling, many of the facts are drawn from the trial transcript ("Tr."). Unless 
noted otherwise, those facts are believed to be uncontested. 
5 
April 2005, it contracted with Appellant i4 to create a new website for it. R. 294 Tr. p.p. 
14-15 
2. The contract provided that Robertson's would pay half the contract amount 
down, which.it paid, with the balance due "when the site has been completed and 
approved." R. 32 and 233; R. 294 Tr. p. 121. 
3. The contract was silent as to an exact completion date, but Robertson's 
anticipated i4 would have the website completed so that Robertson's could use it by 
midsummer 2005. R. 32 - 42; R. 294 Tr. p. 261. 
4. By December 2005, well after the boating season had ended, Robertson's 
still did not have a website. Robertson's lost substantial business because of the delay. 
See R. 294, Tr. P. 92. 
5. Having lost the whole season, Robertson's demanded a refund of the 50% it 
had paid on the contract. R. 294 Tr 21,1.1. 21-23 (and trial exhibit #9). 
6. i4 refused to refund, and Robertson's filed suit for breach of contract for 
failing to create the website, and for unjust enrichment on March 15, 2006. R. 1 - 3. 
7. i4 counterclaimed, likewise, for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. 
R. 14 - 27. 
8. After bench trial in August 2008, the trial court took the matter under 
advisement and then entered a minute entry ruling in favor of i4 on its unjust enrichment 
claim and that claim only. The trial court ordered each party to bear its own costs and 
attorney fees and directed i4 to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
accordance with the trial court's decision. R. 233 - 235. 
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9. Before doing so, i4 moved for attorney fees, arguing much as it does here 
that the trial court should have found it to have prevailed on|it contract claims and so 
should have awarded i4 attorney fees. R. 237 - 251. The trial court declined to do so. R. 
269. i4 then prepared the Findings of Fact and Conclusions |of Law and the Judgment. R. 
275 - 280. i4 timely appealed, upon which Robertson's cros$-appealed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On Appeal: 
The standard of review Appellant i4 uses is incorrect because i4 has conflated two 
issues into one. Because i4fs argument involves a contractual provision for attorney fees, 
the first issue is which party, if any, prevailed on contract claims This issue merits 
significant deference to the trial court. Once the proper standards of review are applied, 
it is clear that the trial did not err. i4 did not and could not pitevail on its breach of 
contract claim and, without the contractual provision for attorney fees, there was no 
lawful basis for awarding attorney fees. Because whether Robertson's breached is a 
factual determination, i4 should marshal the evidence supporting a finding that 
Robertson's did not breach. Then it should demonstrate that this evidence is contrary to 
such a findng. i4 does not do so, 
The trial court did not just "disregard the contract." Despite i4fs requests that it 
reconsider, the trial court declined to rule or conclude that either party prevailed on its 
contact claims against the other party. As to i4fs contract clai^ n, that conclusion was 
correct because the trial court never made a finding that Robertson's breached. Although 
7 
the trial court did not state it expressly, the record evidence shows that Robertson's could 
not have breached because the only performance required of it was payment. Payment, 
however, was contingent on two conditions precedent: (1) that the website was completed 
and (2) that Robertson's approved it. The trial court never found that either of these 
conditions were satisfied, which was consistent with the evidence. 
i4fs analyses claiming it is a prevailing party for purposes of an award of attorney 
fees is flawed. Admittedly Utah statute §78B-5-826 provides that a "court may award 
attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon contract when the 
contract allow[s] at least one party to recover attorney fees" (portions omitted). But 
neither that statute nor any case says the court must award such fees. Nor does any case 
authorize the award of fees absent a finding that a party prevailed on that contract. 
i4 claims it "defeated" Robertson's contract claims. But the trial court did not 
make that finding, nor did it find i4 to be a prevailing party under the contract. Attorney 
fees are not recoverable for claims sounding in unjust enrichment. Labels aside, what the 
trial court ordered did not conform to the doctrine of unjust enrichment. Rather, what the 
trial court did (and which no party requested) was to reform the contract de facto and 
order specific performance of its reformed version. As such, if there was any prevailing 
party, it would have been Robertson's, and it should have been awarded fees if anyone. 
Utah law recognizes that there may be simultaneous winners or losers and that no 
party prevailed. Thus, absent a finding that i4 prevailed on its contract claims, the trial 
court could not award attorney fees and did not abuse its discretion in not awarding fees 
to i4. Finally, i4fs "public policy" argument is nothing more than i4fs subjective view of 
8 
this particular case and lacks any general application. If attorney fees need to be 
apportioned as a matter of public policy to address improper! litigation, tools to do so 
already exist. 
On Cross-Appeal: 
The trial court erred in awarding i4 judgment based on unjust enrichment for 
several reasons, the most obvious being that the remedy of utijust enrichment is not 
available if an explicit contract exits. 
Robertson's should be awarded its reasonable attorney fees in defending against 
i4Ts appeal, which seeks only one thing: attorney fee under the contract. Utah statute 
provides that where one side to an agreement can recover such fees, the other side should 
be able to as well. Moreover, Utah case law hold that contractual provisions for attorney 
fees should extend to the appellate process as well. To do otherwise diminishes the 
contractual rights to a party who is successful on appeal. Finally, the trial court failed to 
make the factual findings necessary to support a legal conclusion that i4 prevailed based 
on unjust enrichment. 
ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. i4 Omits an Issue And Standard of Review And, Therefore, Fails to 
Properly Support its Case. 
This case involves a contractual attorney fee provision^ which i4 incorrectly 
analyzes in its choice of issues and standards of review. i4fs Initial Brief states the sole 
issue as "[d]id the trial court incorrectly disregard the contract and should attorney fees 
and costs have been awarded to i4 Solutions." Op. Br. p. vi. jThis is really two issues and 
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i4 erroneously combines the issues of (1) which party prevailed on its claims in contract 
(if any) and, (2) the trial court's failure to award attorney fees to i4 as if they were one 
issue. 
As a result, i4 also misstates the proper standard or review. The correct analysis 
should first focus whether any party prevailed on its contract claim against the other. 
"Whether a party is the prevailing party in an action is a decision left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court and reviewed for an abuse of discretion." Carlson Distrib. Co. 
v. Salt Lake Brewing Co., L.C, 2004 UT App 227, f 16 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (citing R.T. 
Nielson, Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, P25, 40 P.3d 1119). "Which party is the prevailing 
party . . . . depends, to a large measure, on the context of each case, and, therefore, it is 
appropriate to leave this determination to the sound discretion of the trial court." 
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^27 quoting R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11,1f 25, 
40P .3d l l l9 . 
If neither party prevailed on its contract claim at trial, the attorney fees provision 
in the contract is irrelevant, because attorney fees are only warranted in Utah when 
provided for by contract or statute. Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). So 
although an award of attorney fees is typically a matter of law reviewed for correctness as 
i4 posits, that "is not true where the fees are predicated upon findings of fact, in which 
case we review the award of fees for an abuse of discretion." Paul deGroot Bldg. Servs., 
LLC v. Gallacher, 2005 UT 20, Tfl8 (citing R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, fl6, 
40 P.3d 1119 and Warner v. DMG Color, Inc., 2000 UT 102,121, 20 P.3d 868). The 
real issue for purposes of i4fs appeal is simply whether the trial court was correct in 
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declining to find that i4 prevailed on its contract claims. And the standard of review i4 
proposes is incorrect. 
In essence, i4 contests the trial court's de facto determination that Robertsons' was 
not in breach of the contract. Whether a party materially breached a contract is a question 
of fact. See Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & \Prug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445, 
458 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (whether party breached lease is a question of fact.) Typically, 
if one assails a court's factual determination, it is required to marshal the evidence in 
support of that finding and demonstrate that it is insufficient. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. 
Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah App. 1997); Poster, Gouli Ames & Weaver, Inc. v. 
Morse, 887 P.2d 872 (Utah App. 1994). 
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds tol a review of the accuracy of 
the lower court's conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." Saunders 
v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). Here, however, i4 doesn't even attempt to 
marshal the evidence. It does not really contest any of the trial court's factual 
determinations or its failure to make the factual determinations i4 wanted, nor does it 
argue factual determinations were not supported by the evidence. Rather, it simply 
argues the trial court "found each of the elements [for i4?s] breach of contract claims in its 
findings of fact" (Op. Brief p. 3; id. p. 9) and argues that it was a prevailing party in 
contract. 
But there is no finding that Robertson's breached the contract either in the court's 
minute entry ruling (R. 233 -235) or the Findings of Fact drafted by i4 on the trial court's 
n 
behalf. R. 275 - 277. If 14 truly believed the court made such a finding, it was incumbent 
upon i4 to insert it into the Findings of Fact when it prepared them. It did not and cannot 
now complain that it is absent. I4fs belated assertion that such a finding should be there is 
akin to relying on invited error. Newman v. White Water Whirlpool, 2008 UT 79, [^14 
("The invited error doctrine prohibits parties from 'taking advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error'") (quoting 
Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 12, 163 P.3d 615). 
Based on just i4fs failure to marshal the evidence and the error it has invited, this 
Court should rule against i4. As shown below, however, even had it tried to marshal 
evidence, i4 would have failed because ample evidence showed Robertson's did not 
breach. 
II, i4 is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees Because it Did Not Prevail on Its 
Contract Claims. 
The main thrust of i4?s arguments on appeal is that it prevailed in contract, which 
contained an attorneys' fee provision, so the trial court should have awarded it attorney 
fees as a prevailing party. The trial court, however, refused to find that either party 
prevailed or that Robertson's breached the contract. That determination is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. "An appellate court will not find abuse of discretion absent an 
erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial court's 
ruling." Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469, 472 (Utah 1996) (in the context of discovery). 
There was no abuse of discretion because the trial court's refusal to conclude that 
i4 prevailed on its contract claim was amply supported by the evidence. What i4 fails to 
12 
appreciate is that in addition to showing that it performed or| even substantially performed 
under the contract, i4 had to also show that Robertson's breached. See Bair v. Axiom 
Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, f 14 (noting the third element in & breach of contract claim is a 
breach by the other party). 
Admittedly, evidence showed that i4 performed many (though not all) its duties 
under the agreement and the trial court concluded as much. Kg. R. 233 -244 (i4 
"completed the majority of the work" but the calculator was hot finished). However, 
even assuming that the evidence supported a conclusion that |i4 substantially performed 
the agreement (albeit well after the boating season), it does n|ot follow that Robertson's 
breached. That is because Robertson's had only one duty un$er the agreement, which 
was to pay the remaining balance of $3,275.00. That duty was triggered under the 
contract as follows: 
PAYMENT OPTIONS 
For your convenience, i4 Solutions offers two paymerit options 
* 50/50: You pay 50% of the total website cost at the time of signing, 
and the remaining 50% when the site has been completed and 
approved. 
* Web Leasing: You can make six (6) payments over a period of six 
(6) months. The initial payment is due at the time of signing. 
Monthly payment amounts for each website component are listed 
below the total component amount. 
Defendant i4fs Trial Exhibit #2 (Addendum 1). 
Robertson's was offered and chose the 50/50 option. TfJo party claimed this 
payment provision was ambiguous or that it meant something else, and Robertson's 
understood it to mean just what it said - that is, the remaining (payment was due "when the 
site [was] completed and approved." R. 294, Tr. p. 23 1.1. 9-18. The evidence showed, 
13 
however, that the site was never approved and i4 conceded as much at trial. See R 294 
Tr p. 122 1.1. 2 - 5 (i4fs co-owner conceding the website had not been approved). 
The other condition precedent was completion. The contract was i4's form 
contract and drafted by it. i4 chose its conditions precedent and it did not choose 
"substantially" or "materially" completed as a condition. When coupled with the fact that 
the other condition was approval, one must conclude that unless there was an approval of 
partial completion, the condition was full completion. The website had not been 
completed because it was missing the calculator. See id. p. 140 1.1. 9 - 15 (i4 conceding 
the calculator could not be found). Because the conditions precedent to Robertson's duty 
to perform were not met, there was no basis for finding a breach by Robertson's. 
Moreover, logically for the website to have been approved, i4 had to have made 
something akin to a "delivery" of the site. But the trial court concluded that any delivery 
was delayed. Indeed, even at trial, much later, the website was not complete and, 
although clearly a password was required for Robertson's to manipulate the website, there 
was no proper evidence or finding that i4 had given the password to Robertson's.3 
Absent such delivery, there was nothing that Robertson's could have approved. 
The trial court's own questioning showed that it felt that for delivery to be 
effective, i4 had to provide Robertson's with "an administrative-type password to have 
the ability to access to change the information on the web site." R. 294 Tr p. 105 1.1.17 -
21; see id. p. 84 (where trial court states "I mean, I got the point; he didn't change the text 
3To a certain extent this factor also relates to whether i4 fully performed its contractual 
duties or had a claim for unjust enrichment. 
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on the website. He knew he potentially had the ability but np password to do it"). The 
fact that no password was provided to Robertson's is further| supported by the trial court's 
minute entry decision, which ordered i4 to take any further sf:eps necessary to tender all 
rights and access to the website to Robertson's. R. 235,27^. 
In sum, there was substantial evidence from which th£ trial court could have 
concluded that Robertson's did not breach the agreement. Where a party prevails in 
unjust enrichment, not on contract, Utah law does not provide for the recoupment of 
attorney fees. In fact, Utah law is to the contrary, providing that absent very special 
situations,4 attorney fees are recoverable only where authorised by statute or contract. 
Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). And where it is leased on contract, "[a]n 
award of attorney fees is improper when it is not based on the terms contained in the 
parties' agreement or where the breach is not based on contract." Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986). Without a determination that Robertson's 
breached, there can be no finding that i4 prevailed on its contract claims. 
III. The Trial Court's Refusal to Rule That i4 Prevailed on its Contract 
Claim Was No Oversight. 
Perhaps the trial court should have specifically stated that neither party prevailed 
on its contract claims, but it did not just "disregard the contract" as i4 frames the issue 
(Op. Brief p. vi). i4 cannot complain on that point, however, |for it drafted the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. But the trial court's refusal to tule in i4's contract claim 
was not accidental. It was faced with the issue in the pleadings and at trial. For purposes 
4E.g. plaintiffs as private attorneys general. 
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of attorney fees, it arose when counsel requested fees in closing argument, noting that 
there was a contractual provision for fees. R. 294, Tr. p. 162 1.1. 8 - 20. The trial court 
then took the whole matter under advisement and ultimately concluded by its minute 
entry of September 3, 2008, that i4 had "proven the elements of its claim for unjust 
enrichment." R. 233. It did not award damages in contract, nor did it find that either 
party had prevailed in contract or even that any side had breached. R.233 - 236. 
Consequently, "[e]ach side [was] ordered to pay their own attorney fees and costs" R. 
236. 
Before the minute entry, while the matter was under advisement, i4 again argued 
its case - i.e. that it had prevailed in contract - by filing its unsolicited "Defendant's 
Supplemental Trial Memorandum (Post-Trial)." R.210 - 213. Notably, all parties also 
filed requests for and affidavits of attorneys' fees, so the issue of fees and contract were 
squarely before the trial court. See generally R. 214 - 232. Then, after the trial court 
issued its September 3, 2008, minute entry ruling, i4 filed still another motion and 
memorandum, again entreating the trial court to find that i4 had prevailed in contract and, 
therefore, should be awarded attorneys' fees. R. 237 -248 (Defendant's Motion for 
Attorneys' Fees and memorandum in support). As here, the thrust of that motion was that 
i4 should be awarded attorneys' fees because i4 prevailed on "[Robertson's] contract 
claim and because [i4] prevailed on its own claims." R. 0240. 
The trial court rejected i4?s defacto requests for reconsideration, no doubt because 
the Court weighed the evidence and felt it simply wouldn't support i4's contract claim. R. 
269. And contrary to i4's argument, the fact that Robertson's did not prevail on its 
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contract claims does not ipso facto equal a determination that i4 did prevail. In fact, 
Utah's appellate courts recognize that determining who is th0 prevailing party can be 
problematic and there can be "circumstances where both, or heither, parties may be 
considered to have prevailed." R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, f 25; see Radman 
v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^27 n. 11 (rejecting the notion that there can be 
only one prevailing party and upholding trial court determination that both parties 
prevailed as well as noting the trial court's superior position to make such 
determinations). 
In this case, there was a contract and Robertson's had paid according to its terms. 
R. 0233, 0276. However, even at the time of trial, well after a reasonable time had 
passed, the website was not entirely completed. There was a substantial delay in its 
development and the evidence was clear that Robertson's lost substantial business 
because of the delay. See R. 294, Tr. p. 92. But Robertson's duty under the contract was 
still not yet triggered and, therefore, the trial court correctly declined to find a breach by 
Robertson's. 
IV. i4fs Analyses Regarding Prevailing Parties is| Incorrect. 
At pages 4 - 10 of its opening brief, i4 argues a variety of bases contending it 
should be found to be the prevailing party and, thus, entitled to attorney fees. Those 
analyses are simply flawed; but irrespective of those flaws, i4l offers no support 
whatsoever for the proposition that it should be awarded attorney fees under a contract, 
where there is no finding that it prevailed on that contract. S&e Groberg v. Hous. 
Opportunities, Inc., 2003 UT App 67 (upholding the failure tp award fees to a defendant 
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where plaintiffs claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment were completely 
defeated). Nonetheless, Robertson's addresses i4fs analyses in order. 
A. i4 Did Not Prevail Under the Contract. 
i4 argues that it must be the prevailing party because it defeated Robertson's 
contract claims and "authority across the county recognizes that a defendant is a 
prevailing party when he defeats a plaintiffs claims." Op Br. p.p. 4 -5. This ignores the 
fact that the trial court could easily have found, and apparently did find, that neither party 
prevailed on its contract claims. In any event, it declined to find i4 prevailed. Supra. 
Such a finding is in harmony with Utah case law, which has rejected "rigid applications" 
and the "net judgment" rule as anything more than a starting point in determining 
"which-if any—party was successful." A.K.&R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 
2004 UT 47, f 25. Rather Utah has adopted a "flexible and reasoned approach to 
deciding in particular cases who actually is the prevailing party." Radman v. Flanders 
Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^26 (citations omitted). Extraterritorial authority 
notwithstanding, in Utah the determination of which party, if any, is a prevailing party, is 
left to the trial court's sound discretion. 
Moreover, it is puzzling why the trial court resorted to unjust enrichment in the 
face of well-known precedent precluding that relief where a contract exists (addressed 
below in Counter-Appeal). However, labels aside, when one analyzes the net effect of 
the trial court's decision, it applied an equitable remedy that neither party requested. In 
the end, the trial court reformed the contract and then ordered specific performance of its 
version. 
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First, the trial court reduced i4fs contractual duties by (removing the missing 
calculator from its contract duties and by allowing significant extra time for i4fs 
performance. Then, it reduced the contract price for the omitted calculator and reduced it 
again because there was already such a delay in i4?s actual performance. Robertson's was 
ordered to pay this adjusted amount. 
But Robertson's didn't have the website in any normal sense, and there was a 
contract. So unjust enrichment cannot apply. Moreover, the trial court found that i4 had 
to "take any further steps necessary to tender all rights to the website it created to 
[Robertson's] if it has not already done so." This had the effect of giving i4 still more 
time to perform under the contract, but still ordering it to perform under the trial court's 
reformed contract.5 In short, the trial court concluded that i4 needed to complete its 
reformed contractual performance. 
Robertson's concedes this may be a novel view of the trial court's ultimate 
decision. But it is accurate as to the net result, and accentuates the practical difficulties in 
assessing which party prevailed at trial and under what theory. Under this view though, 
it was Robertson's that prevailed based on contract, and Robertson's, not i4, would likely 
be entitled to fees. 
^Notably this last step should not be necessary for recovery under unjust enrichment. 
That doctrine requires that the benefit already be conferred and no further tender should be 
required. 
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B. There May Be Simultaneous Winners or Losers With no Party 
Prevailing. 
i4 argues that the "Court must pick a winner" because two parties cannot 
simultaneously prevail and that under Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 117 
(Utah 1998) "there can be only one prevailing party." Op. Br. p. 6. By i4's logic, there 
can be no "draws," which is simply wrong. As a general premise it has been rejected by 
this Court in the context of statutory provisions for attorney fees (A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing & Heating v. Guy, 2002 UT App 73), as well as contractual provisions for 
attorney fees. Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351. So it is "entirely 
appropriate, when adequately supported by the facts, to conclude, as the trial court did 
here, that there is no prevailing party." Whipple, 2002 UT App 73, ^[18. In fact, 
numerous cases result in "draws" where there are simultaneous "winners," simultaneous 
"losers" or simply no winners. For example, in Bonneville Distrib. Co. v. Green River 
Dev. Assocs., 2007 UT App 175, where both parties defaulted, the trial court applied the 
discretion and common sense called for in Whipple and so found that neither party was 
entitled to attorney fees. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1986) was 
perhaps more like this case because there, neither party was in default, and the Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the determination that neither was entitled to attorney fees. 
Also, i4fs concept that "there can be only one prevailing party" is a partial quote, 
limited in its application and is not a holding that can be applied here.6 i4 relies on 
Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, in which both sides obtained some monetary 
6And although the phrase appears in several cases, Meadowbrook, is not one of them. 
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relief in contract against the other. Mountain States, 783 P.2ft 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
But in Mountain States, this Court was reviewing specific contract language, which 
referred to "the prevailing party" and so the phrase must be yiewed in that context. 
Consequently, the more complete statement of this Court's nfiling there is as follows: 
under the provision at issue, there can be only one prevailing party even 
though both plaintiff and defendant are awarded monqy damages on claims 
arising from the same transaction. 
Mountain States, 783 P.2d at 556 (emphasis added). Moreover, this Court noted in 
Mountain States, itself, that in some cases both sides could bfc entitled to entitled to some 
attorneys' fees if the agreement did not employ the same phraseology. Id. citing Trayner 
v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). 
i4 analogizes this case to Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co., v Ross., 849 
P.2d 1187 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) claiming that, as in Equitably, it incurred fees defending 
against Robertson's breach claim. Op. Brief p.8. But no matter how many ways i4 
couches it, to be awarded fees pursuant to a contractual provision, somewhere the trial 
court must have found that i4 won on the contract issues. Furthermore, Equitable 
involved claims for breach and recision of the same contract leased on unilateral mistake. 
In other words, both were claims on the contract at issue. Sinfiply put, Equitable was 
successful on its contract claims; i4 was not. 
C. i4 Had no Breach of Contract Claim Because There Was no Breach. 
i4 argues that the "trial court also ruled in its final judgment that i4 also met each 
of the elements of its breach of contract claims." Op. Brief p. 9. That is simply untrue. 
For i4 to meet all the elements for breach of contract, the triall court had to find that 
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Robertson's breached the agreement. The trial court made no such finding and was 
correct in declining to do so. Supra. 
D. Attorney Fees Are Not Awarded For Prevailing in Unjust 
Enrichment. 
One problem with most of i4's analyses is that they presume a substantive 
difference necessarily arises based on who files first. In that world, it is important for i4 
that its claims are couched as defensive, thereby "defeating" Robertson's initial contract 
claim rather than standing on their own merits. Utah law, however, disfavors a 
substantive difference based on who files first (or in this case, last). See CCD, L.C. v. 
Millsap, 2005 UT 42, j^ 28 (noting the Utah Supreme Court's wariness "of embracing 
statutory interpretations that confer legal rights based on victories in races to the 
courthouse"). 
Nonetheless, to support its position that the race to the courthouse is important, i4 
casts its net to federal court in Illinois for the case of Tax Track Systems Corp. v New 
Investor World, Inc., 478 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2007). Op. Brief p. 9 -10. In Tax Track, 
plaintiff, Tax Track, filed suit on four claims, one of which was breach of contract; 
Defendant, NIW, counterclaimed for breach of contract and quantum meruit. On 
summary judgment the trial court dismissed all the parties' claims and awarded NIW 
attorney fees and costs, which was affirmed on appeal. i4 now analogizes itself to the 
defendant there, NIW, claiming Tax Track supports its position because NIW's 
counterclaims were noted as defensive and compulsory. i4 claims it should also get fees 
because its claims were also defensive and compulsory and they also defeated 
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Robertson's claims. 
Tax Track, however, is not only non-binding, it is distinguishable. In Tax Track, 
the trial court had determined that "NIW defeated all of Tax [Track's claims" which 
necessarily included those based on the contract - in other wc|)rds, NIW prevailed on 
contract. That is not what happened here and is not what thei trial court found. In Utah 
the prospect of a draw is clearly available and here the trial court was of the opinion that 
no party prevailed regarding contract claims. By the same token, the trial court in Tax 
Track was apparently of the opinion that NIW prevailed on it[s contract claims. 
V. Public Policy Does Not Compel Awarding Attorney Fees to i4. 
i4 argues that sound public policy militates in favor awarding attorney fees "to a 
prevailing party who has negotiated to receive them (particularly a defendant) and who 
has proven non-liability for claims asserted against him." Op}. Brief p. 10. i4 asserts that 
innocent defendants need "the ability to escape attempts to extort them."7 However, i4 
gives no real reason why business defendants need any more [protection than plaintiffs 
who have been damaged by defendants. And often as not, defendant status hinges of i4fs 
"race to the courthouse" not the merits of a case. In short, i4ffe policy argument is not a 
policy argument at all. There is no broad application and the |claim is simply subjective 
7
 No doubt, i4fs mischaracterization of the suit as Ian "attempt to extort" results 
from the natural tendency of litigants to vilify the opponent. However, the simple fact is, and 
the trial court found, i4 delayed in not performing under the contract, although it eventually 
created a website. Nonetheless, Robertson's did not have that website even long after the 
summer boat sales season had passed and it suffered damages as a result of the delay. Under 
those circumstances, i4 should not be too surprised if Robertson's felt i4 had not performed 
and wanted its money back. 
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and particular to i4's view of this case. 
Moeover, tools already exist to protect defendants and curb extortionate lawsuits. 
Among them is the Utah statute that provides for attorney fees where an action or defense 
is not in good faith. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-825 (2008). Another is the statute on 
which i4 bases some of its claim, Utah Code Ann. 78B-5-826 (2008). It provides that a 
trial court "may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a civil action 
based upon any promissory note, written contract. . . when the provisions . . allow at least 
one party to recover attorney fees.'5 Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008). Contrary to 
i4fs contentions though, it does not provide for recovery of attorney fees just because 
there may be a contract involved in the case - and no case says that. Biut it does serve the 
laudable purpose of, and was designed to level the playing field by dispensing with one-
sided attorney fees provisions: 
The statute levels the playing field by allowing both parties to recover fees 
where only one party may assert such a right under contract, remedying the 
unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many contracts of adhesion. 
In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common law result where a 
party that seeks to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has 
a significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the 
contract. The former could demand attorney fees if successful, while the 
latter could not. 
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, |18 (portions omitted, decided under former identical 
statute Utah Code Ann. §78-27-56.5). 
No doubt there are more tools addressing i4Ts policy concerns. But at least one is 
the case law discussed in the very cases i4 cites, but ignores. That is the "flexible and 
reasoned approach" for determining who were prevailing parties, as first described in 
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Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d 551(l|tah Ct. App. 1989). It has 
since been applied in a variety of contexts for both statutory) and contractual bases for 
attorney fee awards. "Essentially, this approach emphasizes 'the notion that courts should 
not ignore common sense when deciding which party prevailed.'" SFR, Inc. v. Comtrol, 
Inc., 2008 UT App 31, If 11 (quoting J. Pochynok Co. v. Smedsrud, 2007 UT App 88,19, 
in turn quoting Whipple, 2004 UT 47, % 11, 94 P.3d 270). The policy tools are in place 
and the trial court applied them properly. 
ARGUMENT ON CROSS-APPEAR 
On Cross Appeal Robertson's disputes the legal and factual underpinning of the 
trial court's determination that i4 prevailed on a theory of unjust enrichment and argues 
that the Court of Appeals should award Robertson's attorney fees on appeal. 
I. Unjust Enrichment Does Not Apply Because There is an Express 
Contract 
Unjust enrichment is an equitable restitutional remedy that applies when a party 
"has and retains money or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another . . . . " 
American Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) 
(citations omitted). However, the remedy of unjust enrichment is not available if a 
remedy is available at law. "If a legal remedy is available, si^ ch as breach of an express 
contract, the law will not imply the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment. 'Recovery in 
quasi contract is not available where there is an express contract covering the subject 
matter of the litigation.'" American Towers Owners Ass'n v. (JCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 
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1193 (Utah 1996) (quoting Mann v. American W, Life Ins, Co,, 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 
1978)). 
Here, the trial court found that there was a contract or "agreement" and 
Robertson's had paid according to its terms. R. 233, 276. That agreement expressly 
covered the subject matter of the unjust enrichment claim. Accordingly, the trial court 
erred in granting judgment based on unjust enrichment. See Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 
666, 670 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (trial court "does not have the authority to ignore existing 
principles of law in favor of its view of the equities"). 
Robertson's submits that because of this error and because the trial court declined 
to find for i4 on contract, or find that any party prevailed on contract, the trial court 
should have simply dismissed as to all parties and claims.8 But Robertson's has had to 
face i4's appeal, which necessarily is based entirely on the written contract. The trial 
court may have declined to find that either party prevailed on its contract claims at trial. 
It does not follow, however, that fees should not be considered for Robertson's on this 
appeal. 
II. Robertson's Should Be Awarded Attorney Fees Because I4's Appeal Is 
Based on the Contract 
Robertson's had chosen not to appeal because, frankly, the amount of money at 
issue simply wasn't worth it and no overarching principal was at stake. i4, however, 
chose to appeal solely on the issue of attorney fees under the contract and virtually 
8An appropriate substantive result here would be reversing the trial court's ruling on 
unjust enrichment with remand for dismissal and orders consistent with the reversal. 
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nothing else.9 See Op. Brief generally. Having done so, i4 should be ordered to pay 
Robertson's attorney fees incurred in this appeal because, as shown above, Robertson's 
prevails as against all i4!s arguments. 
In Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406, 409 
(Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme Court held that where a contract includes a provision for 
payment of attorney fees to the prevailing party, if the actioil is brought to enforce the 
contract, it applies on appeal as well, stating as follows: 
The parties here agreed to pay reasonable attorney's fies if it became 
necessary to enforce the contract. If plaintiff is required to defend its 
position on appeal at its own expense plaintiffs rights 
thereby diminished. We therefore adopt the rule of law that a provision for 
payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by 
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the 
enforce the contract, and overrule Swain and Downey \ 
point insofar as they may be to the contrary. 
under the contract are 
action is brought to 
State Bank on this 
Mgmt Sews. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 4Q9 (Utah 1980) (referring to 
Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 279 P.2d 109 (Utah 1955) mid Downey 
State Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 556 P.2d 1273 (Utah 1^76)). 
Admittedly, this holding has been applied largely in cases where the prevailing 
party below was awarded or entitled to fees at trial and was successful on appeal. E.g. 
Mgmt Servs, (supra)', Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879 (Utah 1988). But the language of 
Mgmt Servs, is fairly clear, and its reasoning applies with eq^al force to this case. Even 
though based on the trial court's ruling, no party was entitled Ito attorney fees, i4's appeal 
9
 It states " I agree to pay all collection costs, including court costs and reasonable 
attorney's fees if collection is required." R. 206. 
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for attorney fees is just such an "action . . .brought to enforce the contract." Id. Indeed, it 
can only be properly based on the contract's attorney fee provision. 
In Mgmt Servs., the Court reasoned that that "if plaintiff is required to defend its 
position on appeal at its own expense plaintiffs rights under the contract are thereby 
diminished." Thus, if fees will not be awarded for the successful defense of an appeal 
where only the attorney fees due under a contractual provision for such fees is involved, 
that successful party loses the benefit of the contractual provision both parties relied on. 
Dixon v. Stoddard, 765 P.2d 879, 881 (Utah 1988), illustrates this. In Dixon, the 
plaintiff sued to recover money due under a promissory note, which contained a provision 
for attorney fees. The trial court "granted plaintiffs summary judgment but declined to 
grant them attorney fees incurred in the collection of the note." Dixon , 765 P.2d at 881 
(Utah 1988). The Utah Supreme Court held the trial court erred in failing to award fees at 
trial and plaintiff received fees for the appeal as well. But if that case had been slightly 
different and held that plaintiff was not entitled to fees, defendant would have been 
manifestly disadvantaged by the difference in their respective positions on the attorney 
fee issue. That's because fees were the only issue and if plaintiff succeeded on appeal, 
defendant would be faced with paying both its fees and plaintiffs. On the other hand, if 
defendant succeeded, plaintiff would not be faced with the similarly grim prospect of 
paying both parties' attorney fees. 
Utah statute addresses this potential inequity. It provides as follows: 
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails in a 
civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or other 
writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
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promissory note, written contract, or other writing allo^v at least one party 
to recover attorney fees. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-826 (2008). The statute's language in no way restricts its 
application of this "leveling statute" to trial courts; And it is designed to remedy the 
"unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many contracts" under which one party 
could get fees while the other could not. Bilanzich v. Lonetti,\ 2007 UT 26, ^ [18 {supra). 
Even though under the leveling statute, the parties should stand on equal footing, unless 
possibility of awarding attorney fees goes both ways on appeal, one party ill always be 
disadvantaged and their contractual rights diminished. 
Here, as in Dixon, the trial court failed to award any party fees, but i4 is once again 
claiming it prevailed on the contract and, as in Dixon, is seeking only attorney fees based 
on the contractual language. Robertson's is now forced to defend its position, and if i4 
were to prevail, it would be awarded fees for the appeal as w0ll as remand to the trial 
court for fees incurred at trial. But if attorney fees are not similarly due to Robertson's 
for defending this appeal, its contractual rights are diminished because it simply would 
not be on an equal footing vis-a-vis the contract's attorney fe^ provision. Mgmt Sen's., 
617 P.2d at 409 (Utah 1980). In fact, if i4 and similar parties, who seek only attorney 
fees on appeal, are not faced with paying the other party's attorney fees, every opposing 
would be disadvantaged and the salutary purposes of the leveling statute and the ruling 
from Mgmt Servs., are subverted. 
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III. The Factual Findings do Not Support The Legal Conclusion That 
Robertson's Was Unjustly Enriched. 
Under Utah law the conclusions of law must "find support in, and arise out of, the 
findings of fact." Needham v. First Nat. Bank, 85 P.2d 785 at 787, 96 Utah 432 (Utah 
1938) (citations omitted); Utah R. Civ. P. 52: 
Rule 52(a) requires that a trial court find facts specially in all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury. Such findings of fact must clearly indicate the "mind of the 
court," and must resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the 
conclusions of law and judgment entered thereon. Furthermore, failure of a trial 
court to enter adequate findings requires the judgment to be vacated. 
Parks v. Zions First Nat. Bank, 673 P.2d 590 at 601 (Utah 1983). With respect to unjust 
enrichment, in addition to the lack of an express contract, three elements are required: 
[1] a benefit conferred by one person on another. [2] [t]he conferee must 
appreciate or have knowledge of the benefit. [3] [Acceptance or retention 
by the conferee of the benefit under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the benefit without payment of its 
value. 
Allen v. Ball, 2006 UT 70, |^26 (citing Desert Miriah Inc. v. B&L Auto, Inc., 2000 UT 83, 
^{13, 12 P.3d 580 (portions omitted). Here, however, the trial court failed to find those 
elements - that is, it failed to specifically find a benefit was conferred by i4 upon 
Robertson's; it failed to find that Robertson's appreciated or had knowledge of the 
benefit; and third, it failed to find an acceptance or retention of any benefit by 
Robertson's.10 
As to unjust enrichment, the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
10Robertson's concedes that had it received the website and kept it, it would have been 
inequitable for it not to have paid the value thereof. 
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are sparse. Reviewing them as a whole shows that they mafce general findings about 
things that i4 did, but they say precious little about what if atiy benefit Robertson's 
received or knew about. The Findings of Fact noted that i4 ^performed these services by 
completing the majority of the work on the website." R. 27$ f 5. The context indicates 
that "these services" related to the contract, however, and d0es not indicate that it was a 
benefit that was actually conferred upon Robertson's. The Findings then noted that the 
"website allowed [Robertson's] to change . . . or replace items anytime [Robertson's] 
desired" and Latin text was there simply to show areas wher£ changes could be made. R. 
276 f^ 8. Finally, the Findings state that Robertson's "was notified and instructed on how 
to make these additions, changes, amendments, etc, [sic] by to employee of Defendant." 
R. 276 [^10. From there, the Conclusions of Law summarily State i4 "has proven the 
elements of of its claim for unjust enrichment." R. 277 ^ 12. 
These findings, however are inadequate to "clearly incjicate the 'mind of the court' 
and, likewise are insufficient to 'resolve all issues of material fact necessary to justify the 
conclusions of law and judgment'" that Parks v. Zions First Mat. Bank, (supra.) requires. 
A. There Is No Finding That a Benefit Was| Conferred. 
Notably absent from all this was what the actual benefit was that Robertson's 
received. That is, there is no finding or proper evidence that Robertson's actually 
received the website and the administrative password to use it. The mere fact that i4 
completed the majority of the work on the website does not confer a benefit on 
Robertson's. The website may have allowed Robertson's (an# in fact, anyone with the 
password) to change or manipulate the website, which could conceivably confer a benefit 
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on someone. But that's only true if that someone has the password. For a similar reason 
Robertson's received no benefit from being notified and instructed on how make to make 
such changes. Without the password, Robertson's couldn't actually make any changes 
and so received no benefit. It was left with a website that looked just like the one 
presented at trial - with text in Latin and pictures of old boats, none of which it could 
change. That is simply not a benefit, and to the extent such a site was accessible on the 
internet, it would actually be a detriment. 
By way of analogy, if i4 had been building Robertson's a special car, and had most 
of it built, that in itself would not confer a benefit. Similarly, Robertson's would not be 
benefitted from mere instruction on how to operate its special features. To have a benefit 
conferred, Robertson's had to have the car, the knowledge, and the key. In this case, the 
findings show Robertson's had knowledge that there was a car, and some instruction on 
how it could use the car. Yet even at the time of trial, it had neither the car, nor the keys. 
No doubt, this is why the trial court ordered i4 to "take any further steps necessary to 
tender all rights and access to the website if it has no already done so." R. 277 ^18. But 
such a conclusion is inconsistent with the theory of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment 
occurs when a party "has and retains money or benefits which injustice and equity 
belong to another . . . ." American Towers Owners Assfn v. CCIMech., 930 P.2d 1182, 
1192 (Utah 1996) (additional citations omitted). It is not based on the value of the benefit 
the conferee will have; it is based on what the conferee already has. 
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B. There is No Finding That Robertson's appreciated or Had 
Knowledge of the Benefit. 
Admittedly Robertson's knew there was a website beipg created. But the fact that 
a website is being created is not itself a benefit, so knowledge of that fact cannot be 
knowledge of a benefit. Rather a benefit would be a website that was operational and that 
Robertson's had full access to with a password. There is however, no finding that 
Robertson's had knowledge or appreciation of such a benefit| In fact, the words 
"knowledge, know, appreciate, etc." don't even appear in th$ Findings. Robertson's 
realizes those aren't necessary "magic words," but the best tljat can be said from the 
Findings is that they state that Robertson's "was notified and instructed on how to make 
these additions, changes to the website." That is a finding of knowledge of how to do 
something. But absent knowledge of the password as well, it cannot be a finding of the 
knowledge of the benefit. 
C. There is no Finding That Robertson's Accepted or Retained a 
Benefit. 
Third, the trial court is required to find that Robertson]s accepted or retained the 
benefit of the website. Unjust enrichment occurs when a paity "has and retains money or 
benefits which injustice and equity belong to another . . . ." ^ee American Towers 
Owners Ass'n v. CCIMeck, 930 P.2d 1182, 1192 (Utah 1996) (supra., additional 
citations omitted). There simply is no such finding and, indeed, the evidence was that 
Robertson's had not approved the website. A finding that Robertson's "was notified and 
instructed on how to make these additions, changes, amendments, etc, [sic] by an 
employee of Defendant" (R. 276 If 10) is not a finding of either acceptance or retention. 
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Nor is a finding that the "website allowed Plaintiff to change or modify it." In point, the 
trial court's conclusion that i4 should tender remaining rights and access to the website is 
inconsistent with a finding that Robertson's accepted or retained anything. That is 
especially true given that this ruling came years later at trial and the website was still not 
fully complete. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's ruling denying attorney fees in favor of i4 should be upheld. 
Attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by contract or statute. The trial court 
properly did not award fees to i4 because it declined to find i4 prevailed in contract. On 
appeal, i4 fails to properly present its case, which requires it to marshal evidence to show 
the trial court should have found that Robertson's breached the contract. The evidence 
was clear that Robertson's did not breach. 
However, the trial court's judgment in favor of i4, which was based on unjust 
enrichment, must be reversed. Unjust enrichment is not available as remedy where, as 
here, an express contract exists. Also, the trial court failed to make proper findings of 
fact to support a conclusion that Robertson's was unjustly enriched. Finally, the only 
issue raised by i4 is attorney fees due under the contract. In such a case, proper 
interpretation of statute, case law and sound policy dictate that Robertson's and similar 
parties should be awarded attorney fees as a prevailing party. 
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DATED this J2S^ day of June, 2009. 
McINT 
RICHARD K^OipEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross-
Appellant (Robertson's) 
35 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the of June, 2009,1 caused a tme and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to be mailed by 
first class mail to the following: 
Steven L. Rinehart 
Steven Rinehart. LLC 
707 West 700 South, Suite 201 
Woods Cross, Utah 84087 
\\Samba\offserve3\Clients\Robertson's Marine v i4 Solutions\Appeal\Bnef finalOl wpd 
36 
Addendum 1 







Your website wlV be compatible with both Internet Explorer and Netscape, for bbth Windows and Macintosh. 
However, tne administrative portion o'the website (the portion used to control and make changes to the site) 
may only be compatible with the latest version of Internet Explorer for Windows 
PAYMENT OPTIONS 
Fo< your convenience, ?4 Solutions offers two payment options: 
• 50/50: You pay 50% of the total website cost at the time of signing, arid the remaining 50% when 
the site has been completed and approved. 
Web Leasing^ You can make six (6) payments over a period of sue {£j months The initial payme nt 
is due at the time of signing Monthly payment amounts for each we-bsjitc component are irsted 
below tne total component amount 
DESIGN AGREEMENT 
Before starting the graphic design of your site, we require that you complete b Design Agreement so that 
we will bettet understand your company, your brand image, and the customers prid businesses that wilt use 
your sjle. 
PROOFING PROCESS 
Unless otherwise noted, aft graphic design proofs are pubfrdy posted in the Our Work section on w w w y f t ^ . 
AH tame frames discussed are based upon »4 receiving feedback on design proofs within 2 A hours of posting 
In some instances, programming may begin prior to final approval of the graphic elements of the site design. 
With some srte types, programming may be dependent on the graphic design 
COMPONENT SELECTiON 
14 Solutions components are moduiar. You can select the options thai best fit trje needs of your current 
business. You are not limited or restricted to the items provided in this quote. If you have items that are oot 
}i$ied in Ims quote and would tike to know exact priding, please contact your salens representative. Some 
components have more than one option or variation of a service fisted. 14- Solutions works strictly with the 
final order agreement options selected, i4 w# verify with client the specified components desired before 
completing work on behalf of client 
IBUflLDER™ (website management toot) 
This exclusive tool vviH allow you to keep your website effective and up-to-date, ivlost standard protocot tor 
making a change to a website requrres multiple time consuming steps Meanwhile, you are stuck with a site 
that has content that you don't like and want changed. 
Builder puts you in total control Simply tog into the "beck endv of your site and Use our customized iBuiids-r 
menu to make the a d d o n s or changes you need This also means you are in charge of the tnifca! tnputoi 
your data. You can change the text content on the pages Bnd the images that arte displayed You witl neve.-r 
have to pay someone to make those changes, either Everything goes in exactly the way you want it You 
are the winner by saving time and money 
SITE DESIGN 
Our professional destqners and programmers wff worl together with you to create youi website Sue design 
ts much rno e than simp}), seating a IOOK it is creaimg the basic functionality qf your website grid giving 
your ^ue more life thai 3 simple image posted on the vveb Whiie other option^ increase \hs functional*!/ of 
\our website 'he design is critical Site design includes the following 
# Homepage de^iqn 
• Header BTK\ footeis ihat will be present on even, page ot), oui site tyjna all ot your pages together 
and creatirq 3 constant look arvd feet 
* Me^ii and navigation bars that take into cons idera1 ion mterfdi*B de&tgti to ensure maximum 
usability G your weosite 
* Slicing of the site design allowing for HTML iriegrat on to make the pultons on your website 
tompieteh functional 
•
 rvtng the stfe design into the database which makes the site become imore than just an image 
» Database dnver pages t4" at diiow \,Q\J to make enanges to selected features and pdit the content 
of he website. 
Our team wa-tts to ensjre Ihal <OP site look* and ieeis exacUy the vmv that you Iwani if ts easy io navigatt 
and W4^  berve a purpose on ine .vob Yuu wrtt be vttfr- us ever/ step of the wav and nothing w $ be oo&teu 
vuthout your express approval 
Stte Design and iBmJder $1500 00 
22f(«. fo^T, ""XT **£ 
tlrtv.. £k* ^Kiwrc c ItaM^fcc ^r> " ^ f*f> 
t ix \ S3 
j > > > 





±. 7 / > ^ A ^ / A _ ^ ^ - ^ STANDARD SITE COMPONENTS 
PRODUCTS 
Displacing and selling your products online ran dramatically increase voir revenue This paqe would slbvv 
you to display your products directly on your websrie Your products can b& broken down into mu'tiple 
caiegories wriich assist customers *n finding exactly tvhai the, are fooking for ror each product you will De 
able to drsplay a Trtie Description and Price with the option to upioad ar image of the product This pane 
*rlt be compteiely diabase driven allowing you to add edit and remove product with ease 
Websrte reference wwvi lazyqays rorri 
ew RV Search 
Class 














W l W " l M M ) M l l l l l l l < I I I I M I » l ^ 
RV SEARCK e ( Q 
Search nev u$ec length p*tref type color 
Create and edrt categories/remove categories curen categories Glas[tron Ranger Crestlmer 




Wher displayed iength type engine color stock # and MSRP 
Standard options 
Opitnnai options Ihts will allow the user lo djcf on items and the suogs^ted price will change 
1 Larqe image wito 8 thumbnail images 
Price 
LtnKs lo manufacturers 
Print page 
Request mforma ion o** this produc1 torn 
f. *t~W J> /f Products Page $1500 00 fie * V-^f^t^ 
***+ 
JtcU* 
/ « "f? 
*>f#n. * , J&£*rx^ Ly& s«&*~S«~«*n.* 
CK. g^UOtrtL- Cp-Jn*^^ ^ 
<W^ 
- C ^ 
•y 
/^ / rL p,^ rly SctLoL 
I k * O^O $ Ame-iroan Coath Eayte Dn Lrtt ilo*v» Call m.£40.£^d3 
h J *.i r ; > U r > » a J » *>W f a l l M f r i j ' l M 
Fu<?lTyf»e:De&H 
r tasv ^ 
Ciini»bis. Sparta? t 
coJnj r cscf irnere 
CrownCteb Qu&frfjed: 
Call S£b.S0CUr2te lc speofc *£ f t ^ 
*IPTKW5> f ACCESS* *R£$ 
U T * ~ - -.OtFiOe O t r h r n . I 
J " : w-w't C i »• S«&bAut? c ^ r f . 
K i t e U' 3 j ' C T O * : p 
* i H* draj r Le\ si r.a System 
O i Ha V&ca^i Systmstr 
(JX& Gt:$ A$h Tr>p Tec 
E "Frfi/ °kc 
Fi. 
WorcoW - Dty VJ ice Voter Kj m 
Reo'VSaiftcbt: 
Btol Spa* c^cur*^ itekT Pete 
Ceramic 2 a i n r r CaoKtof v F V 
Ld fftteitea^ftterrt Center 
Hy-srjrsc ^bJj*ra« Hvdrfc Hoi 
Lerf/*** ?ai4 Steeps W A I We*. 
Sno/ne- Enc^s^f-Vv Obscure Gal 
Lsc^ !/?«•» *>i 'C-Tj-^r )nc h a - niacJn e » - V * ^ u**"t* t * s~r» -« cofeC-jr m the tn"*jm-iat<tt pnwf iec i Specs cn.»|ir£ ?^aja*r>en$ tecnm_a da5-
j t«ic/5 jiTjh> zii-& IIIUST&M*"* 3 ^ trssei? a' ( n7o-ms- a awsrtojrfe 3f t m c o( po«t<nS 3 n ^ ^ *«Jtye<-t z? chsn jv i G O T M T r w e e 1o matrix P*-
j f ' * t -untn' wtwj jcf r •Tnva io* ' c a l &3i> 50*. orsK V P p "£%" listed * r tiwy jjttv a-i ' C U M * ? ' *< c t o n s * un-M.pt r>stioe snrf tfc wat < r r |«d ' t a x 
a -J O -\.t. EC- r<f unr? are <-'i5j2ct t v - n c - r - z ' c 
I i f Vi i h r O ? 0< ^ ' O H - T / C* rtT li 
NEWS/PRESS RELEASES/CALENDAR OF EVENTS/WITH EVENTS BANNED 
This area will aJJow you to dispiay yoiir company^ achievements and feaiures in med'a This database 
driven s&cUoo will allow you to add articles and features, include short descriptions of each and attach an 
image of your choice A calendar is a good way for your clients to easily Jog or) to your website and vie*v tie 
events you have plannati for the future Jhp calendar wrll be s visual represenfafooi i or a simple calendar 
>ou will OB able to add sho4 \ti\cs lo any day you vvish These titles WJII appear as a bni to event details on 
the day you have chosen for the event 
#}a*f«#iw Hk 
C+S.S *. 
CLtCt ULPJL I . 
Ciinlrdl Pru Am A^&u-dtmn 
i vtOKMruL r « v »r( i^ o*.*<f* n r » r r «< •** 4M. 
£. variolar* Sefttti-
• w LUGKHbKt U> . J W - t L U ^ M I L K L f Pi - f ^ i K t 
^oiWQaMpaui^^ 
HEWS RELEASES 
R A ^ - P " BOATS- N.£W LV5Q RE* FA lii A H f U^i UTILITY" F1UH V *>LAV BOAT WITH Al L T H F COMFQKr 
**tfO 5 *v|t>0 3TH F i ^ t OF F1I5~RCLA£S 
C*fjMAV:CKf SFRXFi. 
>r th<> K » Ti** "*-*< 
News/Press Rel&ases/Cal^ndar of Hvents. $1000,00 
BKVNTRS WOULD NEED TO Bl> CREATED ON AN ^NDIMDlfAL BASIS 
S100.00/HR 
{t PARTS AND SERVICE 
This page wll describe all of the services your firm offers presented in an easy Icj read professional layout 
You w.3' have ihe ability to add an image a1" yojr choice, and modify the iext as needed using ihe jBtnlder 
too 
• Contact Pans and Servrce 
• toforrnaiion about Service Department 
P r^ts and Services, $350.00 
Laryday$„. 
Number One in RV Service' 
Local 313.246 4555 
To!! Free 800.282 7£00 
Atf lazychys Service Is Always Part Df The 
"o &eep voir ^X n^mncj ewiOoWv sr^ lu*rv- pondrtru«Lazy Day^io f f ugh * "He Tirss t*ne Q.J cow^mefi i tc ine 
P'-ope- se»ivt>ig JUP your cwtch be^-ns wtfh eyensive and ongosng sadism tranrr- erf OLTPVIA^VDA CerUficd Teirv ICIJ^E, 
V»sn rnp- o* oa 22o ^ er v^e bs%. -^d yoi "1 cjsf r«sLfcs ATC* *th exs muh-mjBar Gats'-psrl& encj accesswtev JK'errsry 
ii »fov iifC^s; ^atriJIr o rn r - srecial susper^itn 37 I rms or A~*3te^5r vcr,ir ^ w i d ^ a r s v^e can do t and tficiud&r 
/JO'"/ In VOL r fnaicrja 
• 2*.J >i*Mi$e fca* $ comop^d t J f-.«-rtJk any Pv *epa r u *vai ranrty wort 
• Direct Ja ^JT , rimnksnl'Mftan vUh -full-time orv-sEte wa^ont^ r^recerrsJt-n bj, Spvwn ape Cantmsis;sO is i 
» Lez Days ejfn?ffl> ^ cwf AOtecnncj&nt srvs s*oponnei s te f t t *e vce yajr P fts~^s 
• Futr- eq Jippt.d csbr«l storr eapabfe of canaete csbnet tebuBi a id iFiieao) +<>&t end ? t r . '^st ing 
*• Full +w/ic~ p«»n a~«d br^jv r&c#y eq jppeo to *tsncfe fezrtf i Ji-erjwss ancf awmnum *epa|r ? 
+ »f «i u t : r custom &j ntau sna ai'brucrh murals tfcet v*ii r ^ e ^ou **v jexra $»>eck* 
• Ltcyc« rc is en-author ui-eci Pre^or ?&ctor pa rt center 
« Ci 1 stair- uNhr art p^rr tociS'v' otJ-1 b Utree Jieatsd 6^ Jowi cran pant CK}Q11« 
£ ^ J--VC bfkF* oen i>ec! Cur on* ^  there are 90 Cem-ecl RV Ischmcttr* i'> rb« wa £0 &i which e^e twri? io serve 
Y. <*) ABOUT US fake the opportunity 1o faniilrarize yourself with' your potential ciients by presenting your mission statement 
onthis.page. You can describe how the s\le was founded and.by whom, expiaiiji the benefits your services 
enables and describe what makes your srte:sa unique and:creative. This page-will becomptetefy database-
driver) so you canedit the content atiany time, 
A t o u i Us; $250>O0 
Company Histoix. 
\Th>i:Uzyddyr< Acivontcge-j 
The Dream Becomes Reality^: 
Don vv&fcwr-e is-president •{riifiz world's largest sricfls-sjt'e 
Rbcr-eotbnal VeHidedeatastwp,Lsrydsys RV-Center'• 
located tri Sfcfthe?,.ft-sutiartri cxrfnmunily,of Tampa, Florida. A 
Tennesse-e rja*}\'e.-,"Djn.Ti«ved:w-Flo::ids. as e.'teenaijsr end 
finished schccl in T&hps teeftar-fc r.etur rtr>o to T.eurtes.see.to 
term for fifeirfe'.iu'w w#rs. Don. Who hstftoVenup pyincfas 
aiziTiW .pa-sferie; then tu rned -to T6mpa to start- a landscape 
| 
Partlythro-u^h^hs-hisownRV.DonbejsjahiD viewRecreafohsi venues JBSa^o\^hinddsfrj-..'Heappr.oached:h& 
t&Uiei"., Hft~&nd &r-5'ferRon,-v^h life K»ejS,OJ"-S£9rtB1ii;errR.>/;;«te.eitershfe3..The-.onsiisfel.bMSin«=;^ :-pian'-:v*?isl£:ie:.»Jl-two;• 
jVatef^'ti fnoru>; Don sistes.-.^ye ws^e-^'c»y:«plG^h5therj|ght--inwket vfes. We-trad no idee Start Tsmpa-'yv^s'sufchjfr-
pre&T.prace iD cjoimo b-y?lnes&. '^.ti'ter^ rsstii&.ihat 5 omeny people came down here:>::fhe .Wini«j* and-we c&M. 
fontee tft&. ttifrtecai in&i'kei ftaef nevei:-'bs^touc*^..Wt=^ju^'*Fie.^*th^.:i;- >v;i; Yvork.^ rJ b:Xd.;yp^'ci be ^ successful;*' 
Original Location 
The oriai'ia' Laiydays RV Center .de^rsftp-operiec: [is doors hi S78 mri'coniisted -oi:a ff^4i5i>3iTien&stled:on:& 1,75: 
sere ste, t*vc. triv^juater-s frtavsnysr y '-aria 1-500 i-: capita*. At/the end of their f ir.styea: in .fcukiness they purcr^seG'-
the icf iheybache^nIsastf ig-«rid' ih&bushc^c^ir jy^ t r a i l s © 
tnonif >:ttiet frs:ys«r';l.f.i7.y.ciays-stayedwrthf::aVfcHra3fc:'S-enci hMtf taV^^1^1^n-9$r-N'tfhi^:th£:y verttufetio^'MtQ 
^ CONTACT US 
• This page watiid have contact: information ifOrytwrc-^pa'ny, such as-theiocaiioiti'.iof .your off ice.,-telephone; 
•numbers and extensions, fax-number, and -.email addresses. This page; .will -he database driven, so it will be 
easy for you to change i? you move or change your contact mformaiton in anothqrway. This will also .'be 
broken up into three categories: 
/ Sales 
V- Service. 
* ^ Ge.her-3.1 Infonfiation 
Department Us lmg; 
]&i&&toi&'l Uii;:»;:» 
'i&z''i»l LS£:y&*?.s:.- y ^ s r^g-ETsrif:tt :Lr5-; 
SALES 
••Ox-tt-rs'&>*?•*•.• 
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f-r-^gj-;^; 
R * ^ ?:*>•• 
te&mt>&. 
r'^J^f'jfj^y 





Odrftaot us standard; $300.00 
7r F 
CONTACT US EMAIL FORM 
(,»r visitors to yuur sue that are us*ng public computers, t* can sometimes be more of a hassle than a help to 
have an email link on your contact us page On public compters with no mart program this email link wrtf 
not worK. and they mil have to iog into a web mail program like Hotmail 
A ' contact us-1 ertia*l form eftminates the need to Jog into a ma if program or a w^b mail site Visitors to your 
sue Simply U\\ out a form nghi on the contact us page of your website that contains fields for name, 
telephone oiwnber, email address, preferred method of contact and comments 
This form, wien submitted, WJJI be smarted direcfey to you You car then centa l the vrsttor back v$a their 
^referred method of contact 
Contact Us Ernati Form: $550,00 
BOAT GALLERY 
A boat galley is u grea[ section to Keep people coming back to the site This section woulc allow visitors to 
post send you irr>3ges of their ooats or adventures and have ^OJ post them on your website. You could ha^p 
conies4 for me best photograph of their adventures Tnm would provide a sunpte form for the user to M out 
mtormoiioR about themselves, contact information and a description oi the pboip The information would h3 
sent to you to* approval before going hve on the v/ebsHe. 
tJ'onejfctf' »vtftf- only cUtrucr ~ 
' f v I J ' v » ,\ '!«• - , ^ ' i i A I V ft ^~ v i*5 >f,:5"r >q T "f>P r% KM* .• iH, rhfi " i j or rh * r 
- -
My** 




- j « 
<*f 
* • * 
1- ' 
* » _ * , ' 
• J J ^ 
J"* 
? ~ or? ct *'.c tet i t y : " 1 Bai^. ^ r g n " ^ a ^ t * fer:r; c ^ r c t ar,i y*«i v c \ v£*u£c>:< C 
«iV bra*- ' ' i M •; tf^o - : ;»\c rr2S- fccii-trtuU ni^dc po! -i cirL'Jbeor i r ">» DDv--r~> 
Sir r-7 ~o> r:~J> s i ^ r ^ r r ^ ro i - f H*4 ts i -»* i ct -*»xr 2^5^ r- f - i t r*W£r"»£<" >i JUT t h i 
rvc»-^r - .->' J w X^fo ?»^  luUViht , tn i r ^ ?n ' ^ p?h ,r ar.«<-dthc ~ar 1 
Create categories 
• Gallery of Boats or Adventures 
Sample 4e5c«pUve fom^ prowling oame, contact info and a ttescnpt»on|ct images 
• 4 jmage upload 
Boat Gallery: $800X0 
j% FINANCE CALCULATOR/CREDIT APPLICATION - ^ 
/ / The finance calculator will a»ow visitors the abifjtv to see what the monthly payment would be on any - *, t * 
particular- ooat tney wish to purchase by fitting m the speculed fields and grossing calculate C-szk.*c*U*jn\<^ 
/ ^ ^ • ^ 
Purchase Price 
Dovyn Payment 
Dmp Down of Loan Terms 
Interest Rate 
Your monthly payment is $_ 
II wdl albo oroide a credit application they can onm off and bring into the store, cj-r fax to your location. 
Finance CaJciilator/C^edit Appl icat ion: $600*00 





1 h<s utilizes Ihe latest technology to allow you to display a short animated intra to get across the main points 
of your organization to the visitors to vour siie This option inc udes Hash intro without sound This quote JS 
only an estimate It is absoluteiv necessary that we vis't wrth ^ou in detail ahouf your flash intro The 
amount of iroe jt takes to do a flash mtrc can vary dramatically 
Flash m\ro without sound: $750,00 
Flasr) intro with sound* $950.00 
TESTIMONIALS 
Wnnen testimonials from actual site-users will allow you to platform toe quality and populanty of your site if 
your clients wll allow you to you may also choose to upload an image with each testimony to define the 
rear sense of satisfaction You wtil be able to add, edit and remove all toe text and images of your 
Teshmon ate page at any time 
Testlmonfals, $200 00 
FAQ 
Tirs page would have multiple questions and answers about your company, youjr concept and howrt wojrs 
The page w&uld he formatted wrth a list of the questions at the top of the page vyhich would link to the 
answe- down bdo* This allows customers who arc looking for answers to specific questions to find therr 
quickly and eabily vvrthout hevno to scroff through the entire page Because yoijjrsite is database driven 
you could easily acid edit or remove questions antf answers 
FAQ-$200,80 
LINKS 
Tn s page would have logos text, and a fink to companies ^ou are affteted with or other websites that 
would oe useiul to yojr a cents or your customers Thts would be database dnven, so ?ou could aac or 
remove fmks as you need ^ p ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Links: $200.00 
EMPLOYMENT 
An employment Dago ts an excellent resource for people who are interested tn wprfcino. for your company 
This Dage would allow you to display the employee characteristics that you are looking for, and fob 
openmgs For each job opening you vrould be able to dispia> the job title* description wage/salary and you 
wojfd like an image 
You could a»so upload 3 PDF o^ your employment application so that applicants 'can prmt it off at home ard 
till it out There would also be instruction* on this page far submitting appbeattons ano contacting the human 
•^sources de.oanment a! Vitality This page would be completely database dnvenc so you could add edrt 
and remove content arid job listings ft there are no current openings a message; will oe displayed mfomrmtg 
visitors that ihere are no openings at this time, and asking them to check back at a later date 
Employment $300.00 
TELL A FREIND 
This Will allow for your curent visitors io recommend your site io their friends and family. People are usually 
more iKely to respop^ to an email when rt comes to them with a friends or fannHylmember's name jn the 
email 
Tell a fnentf: $250,00 
DATA ENTRY 
You may find vourse*f with an excessive amount of products photos descnptjqns o? other forms of data thai 
must bir entered into your s?(e This can set back your scheduled launch date postponing business you 
uanf available IL your clients as soon as possible Let our team take over the tyurden for you Uitlmng oir 
site content a^a'or photo enhancing sktfb we car maKe sure that your information i*> proofed and entered 
accurateh 
t»ata Entry S30 00 per hour 
f HTML NEWSLETTER create a forrr that had the 1 nis would make sending oi«< your newsletter a quick and easy task \Afe woufd i 
basir fjeids that you would Mke to mciude tn your newsletter, and would design the look and feel that you 
wouJd fiko the end product to have You would simply have to fill in the hformalfon in the fields and hit 
L3f td a m the newsletter would go oat to evervone in your mailing hst When the members of your mailing 
list receded yJUi neASlettet i( v\ouJd oe cve-caichiFig and professional looking ywthout you eve- having to 
write a singic line o\ HTML cooe 
HTML Newsletter $500 00 
* • 
MAILING LIST 
This feature witl vookie' chejr browser \o see if they have been to your site beforp if tne^ have not been to 
your«ie 'hey will b prompted to enrer fn their name and emai address Tt\ts will be optional aftovwng thorn 
to rfechntr tc become a pen of vour mailing itst You then VVF{| o&gir to gathe" a idrgc d a t a b l e of names and 
ycu car serd tnem weekly or months spec taK free of cost to vou You have no | 
handling u>st and you can reach 3 greater market based upon signups 
printing cost maiing cost 
"You can log o n to you r site a* any time and at any place thai comems an imernel connection, and see hovv 
many mdwduais have signed up, and what they are interested tn The data will tie contained in an access 
database The information will be available for you to download the latest custonSer hst at-anytime 
MEMBERSHIP REFERRAL PROGRAM 
In order for virions to your site to use this program, they would have lo sagn up fbr the maihng hst to become 
"members" of your sjte 0~>ce they do tbib they can go to a screen where they sijbmii the names and emo I 
aadresses of fnends 1hal Ibey Think would be interested in the sito The database on your sste would keep 
ir^ck cr th;s tnfornatior far each member tf someone that ? member recommenced *c your site <nsi*% and 
signs up fo ' the mailing list too, then the member s status rises and thoy can be rewarded with special 
discounts or coupons* Members are rew&ided tor dnvjng peop'e to your site Whfen someone a member h«*s 
recommended becomes a member the database will notify the anginal member IO update ihem on their 
advanced status and urging them to come back and take advantage of their new deals You can dec icie at d 
change wnat rewards to give member* who generate oris Trie database will track hew many new members 
each member brtncjs ro the site and you can log m and view the list a' any time FThjs program JS one of the-
most effective vvavs lo drive people to vour stte and keep thern coming back 
Membership Referral Program $750.00 
PHOTOGRAPHY 
Images are 3n integral part of every website They are used both in site desigrp arid to shew potential 
customers what vour proaucts took hke If the images of the products on your $ite are pooriy done, ft will 
appear thai your products are tow jn quality and customers will be tess likely tq make a purchase Our 
profession.* pnolog^phers can do the photography for you, ensunr>g higrvquafity trnages that bnng out the 
besi in your product Thev will travel to your *ocat*on to perform an on-srte shocjrt After the shoot, the 
images become you*' property The images can be burned onto a compact chslj, or transferred to you via 
email We offer two packages. 
Package #1 $275.00 
• 30 photos shot 
• Up i d 1/2houis 
• Travel up to 5Q miles from Salt Lake City 
Package #2: $400,00 
• 80 photos shot 
Up to 3 hours 
Travel up to 50 rmtes- from Sail Lake City 
CONTENT DEVELOPMENT 
Everr the must sophisticated web designs lose tne*r fmpaci vtfian the content as JDooriy wntten or organized 
Some companies just do not have the m-house resources to create content lha\ holps them shine 14 
Sol unions content deveiouers have over 15 years of sxpenence wnfrng and editing everything from 
advertising \o teenmea: copy to creative content. Let our content dex^etopers partner with you to make your 
Weo sHe do wnar you need it io do 
Content Development: $65/hr 
EMAIL CONFIGURATION 
in Dusmess, you can't afford fo miss out on important information This makes switching main- email 
addresses both tncky and a httte frightening Our consultants WJJJ come on-site tb your business to set up 
your email accounts and get your OtEtJook or Outlook Express programs set up \o receive emajt from your 
new address. We will time the transfer so thai you don't loose any emails that cpula be vitat to the success 
of vo i r business Let us take vie sS'e-ss out of this change 
Email Configuration: $[75 {for up to 5 compiut&rs) 
$15 pc additional computer 
